Judicial activism is a contested phenomenon, with the liberals and even the conservatives championing it while denouncing its particular manifestations. 
movements in India since 1970s have actively used the courts -especially the Supreme Court -as part of their struggles, whether it be the women's movement, the labor movement, the human rights movement or the environmental movement. Despite this activism, it is now increasingly recognized that the impact of the Court on ground reality has not been consistent. In the area of human rights for instance, studies show that the Court's seminal rulings are often not translated into reality for a range of reasons. 10 In addition, the Court's activism, especially under the umbrella of social action litigation (SAL), has itself come under criticism for its undemocratic nature, lack of effectiveness and judicial grandstanding as well as its alleged violation of separation of powers. As one distinguished observer of judicial activism puts it, "judicial activism is at once a peril and a promise, an assurance of solidarity for the depressed classes of Indian society as well as a site of betrayal".
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In this essay, I join this critique and call attention to the limitations of judicial activism, as it has been practiced more recently, for a progressive social movement politics. 12 Rather than criticizing judicial activism for its counter-majoritarian character 12 This essay is not intended, by any means, to be a critique of judicial activism per se. Rather, its goal is to explore the limits and possibilities of deploying judicial power as part of larger social movement struggles, an area in which the Indian Supreme Court has been a world leader for a long time. This essay is part of an on-going larger project of or its lack of effectiveness on the ground, I focus attention on the ideological character of the Court's particular approach to human rights. In particular, I suggest that the Court's activism increasingly manifests several biases -in favor of the state and development, in favor of the rich and against workers, in favor of the urban middle class and against rural farmers, and in favor of a globalitarian class and against the distributive ethos of the Indian Constitution -that, when taken together, result in an ideological interpretation of human rights. 13 This ideological interpretation is the result, I suggest, of at least two dynamics: the first one internal to the Court itself that grows out of the particular history of the evolution of the Court since 1970s, as an organ of state governance thereby leading to the emergence of what I call 'judicial governance'; and second, a dynamic that is external to the Court and the result of the human rights discourse itself, especially as it has been constructed at the international level and reproduced at the domestic level. The first dynamic neutralizes the transformative potential of the Court, while the second dynamic shows the inherently elitist and anti-poor nature of international human rights.
These dynamics produce a constrained court-centered approach to human rights, despite mine that seeks to compare the place of judicial activism in social movement struggles in Southern democracies. 13 By saying that the Court's interpretation of human rights is 'ideological', I do not mean the more common understanding that it is either dogma, or simply not neutral.
Interpretations of human rights can hardly be neutral. Nor do I use the word 'ideology' in a Marxist sense to mean false consciousness. Rather, what I mean by an ideological interpretation of human rights is that the meaning of human rights that emerges from the Court's jurisprudence is systematically sustaining and reproducing forms of domination in Indian society. the occasionally inspiring judgments that emanate from the Court. I argue that this constrained approach by the Court to human rights is primarily due to its concern that its decisions are compatible with an overall 'logic of the state' in which the higher judiciary plays its appointed role as an instrument of governance much more often than its traditional role as an institution of justice. This notion of 'judicial governance' imposes inherent limitations on the extent to which the Court can be expected to be an active part of social movement struggles for realization of human rights, particularly those rights that are sought to be exercised in conflict with statist and developmentalist ideologies.
Part I provides a brief overview of the Indian Supreme Court's mixed record in protecting human rights including through the incorporation of international legal norms.
In Part II, I explain that this mixed record in protecting human rights is the complex product of several factors including the evolution of the Indian Supreme Court as an organ of governance, its historical tensions with the legislature, its expansion of the human rights agenda due to its prominence as a site of movement politics and the political and class alignment of individual judges. Part III discusses the ideological biases that are inherent in the discourse of human rights itself, including the biases against economic, social and cultural rights, which operate to render the Court as marginal to social movement struggles even when it tries to incorporate international norms into domestic law. In particular, I focus on the way the realization of economic and social rights under international law is seen to be dependent upon either state capacity or greater free market-led consumption and argue that this conceptualization is part of the reason why the Court has been biased. In Part IV, I discuss some recent dissident strands of comparative and international jurisprudence on human rights, which have had a much more active relationship with social movement politics, and ask whether the Indian Supreme Court can learn any lessons from this experience. In Part V, I
conclude by arguing that the Court must abandon its ideological approach to human rights and refashion its jurisprudence in ways that strengthen social movement struggles of the poor.
I. The Supreme Court and human rights: A mixed record 14 The human rights record of the Indian Supreme Court is, by and large, product of the post-Emergency period in Indian politics. Partly due to its desire to atone for its mistake in deciding the infamous Habeas Corpus Case 15 , and to thereby recover the moral ground that it had lost among the public, the Supreme Court began an activist phase, liberally interpreting constitutional rights to expand the domain of freedom. Its focus on human rights was also politically acceptable given that the Janata government in power between 1977 and 1979 could only favorably look upon a Court which was trying to address some of the worst legacies of the Emergency such as the abuses in prisons. Thus, in a series of 14 This section is not by any means, intended to be a comprehensive historical survey of the Supreme Court's vast jurisprudence over more than half a century. Far more qualified jurists and practitioners have already done a superb job of surveying and assessing the Court's record. See e.g., S.P.Sathe, supra n.8. Nor is it a verdict on the Court's undoubted value as a resource for realizing rights, like some other recent studies. See Epp, supra n.9. Rather, the purpose of this section is only to outline the broad directions that the Court has taken recently given its historical evolution, and to assess evidence of judicial bias. In many of these cases, the Court has liberally interpreted the constitutional provisions, reading international law into domestic law. 23 Many of these human rights rulings were made possible through a procedural revolution that is a unique Indian contribution to the world, through the democratization of standing to sue and through such innovative devices as a continued mandamus, and judicial commissions of enquiry. The Court has converted an ordinary list of fundamental rights into a veritable weapon of the weak through creative judicial interpretation. In this, the Court was doubtlessly riding a human rights wave, driven by a range of social movements that were sprouting all over India in the aftermath of the Emergency, which were seeking refuge in the Court after finding that between protection of the environment and workers' rights/tribal rights/housing rights, the Court has chosen the former, without bothering much to balance the two objectives.
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When polluting industries are ordered to be closed by the Court, the workers and their families who are directly affected, are rarely heard before orders are issued. The Court's remarks often display much attention to the environmental issues that are of importance to urban dwellers such as pollution, while showing relatively less attention to rural livelihoods, which are often intricately tied to the land and forests. In the Narmada case, for instance, the Court showed complete callousness to the plight of the rural and tribal people targeted for displacement and declared that "the displacement of the tribals and other persons would not per se result in the violations of their fundamental or other rights.
The effect is to see that on their rehabilitation at new locations they are better off than what they were. At the rehabilitation sites they will have more and better amenities than which they enjoyed in their tribal hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the mainstream of the society will lead to betterment and progress". 43 Implicit in this is the notion that rural and tribal livelihoods are inferior and bound to be displaced through urbanization and modernization. Likewise, the Court's activism in the area of environment is also characterized by a readiness to protect the environment and health of the rich while ignoring the structural poverty and governmental failure that causes these health problems in the first place. Part III. But the Court's order did not concern the rights of the slum dwellers themselves whose recourse to public excretion was the result of lack of infrastructure which is the responsibility of the municipality though Justice Krishna Iyer pointed out that "decency and dignity are non-negotiable facets of human rights and are a first charge on local selfgoverning bodies". 45 Nor did it concern the rights of those dalits who are socially condemned to perform the odious practice of manual cleaning of public toilets, despite the fact that it has been outlawed. 46 Indeed, in several cases, the state courts have also ordered specific measures such as construction of extra public latrines for protecting human health and sanitation under Article 21, while ignoring the rights of the dalits who are employed to clean them manually. 47 To point out these facts is not to belittle the valiant record of the Court in protecting the environment or in attempting to shore up processes of governance, but it must be recognized that the Court's record has much room for improvement.
To sum up, the Court's approach to human rights enforcement could be said to overemphasize civil and political rights at the cost of economic, social and cultural rights. 48 The result of this overemphasis is that the Court has tended to relatively neglect those rights that are of most importance to the vulnerable segments of India society, often other branches of government or that it wanted to ensure that its orders had a reasonable prospect of being implemented. None of these arguments hold any water since the Court has rarely paid much attention to these issues in its impressive career of judicial activism. 49 For example, in the area of environment, the Court has issued orders for closing tanneries, shut down polluting industries and closely supervised enforcement of statutes, rarely constrained by a concern to respect the boundary between law and policy. 50 Even when it was clear that the enforcement of these judicial orders had financial implications that only the government and the legislature had the power to The Court was doing this against the background of a widespread failure of the state to do socio-economic justice resulting in the emergence of a multitude of social movements across the country, among farmers, peasants and women. 60 The moral credibility of the Congress Party, the grand old party of independence, had collapsed, and the government had lost its legitimacy due to the repression during the Emergency. The Janata government which followed in 1977 was weak. These circumstances, coupled with the Court's own attempt at mea culpa for its role during the Emergency, led to the consecration of the judiciary -no doubt self-imagined to some extent 61 -as the preferred branch of governance. The Court's willingness to assume powers of governance, as witnessed in the growth of SAL, also compelled the Court to share the goals of governance and tolerate the methods of governance, much more than in the past.
One such goal was sustainable development, a concept of development laced with environmentalism. The Court's activism in the environmental area from the early 1980s
was not happening in a vacuum, but as part of a state making process that was because, the Court, as a governance mechanism, shares the ideologies of statism and developmentalism. The meanings of these ideologies do not remain fixed; rather, they change over time, reflecting the dominant theories and social relations of the day. Thus, developmentalism has meant many things from state-led industrial growth to sustainable development to rights-based development to neoliberal development. Indeed, many of these meanings coexist in tension within the ideological matrix of the state and the judiciary is not free from them. These ideologies enable the Court to justify the sacrifice of some human rights for others and the social costs imposed on some in the interest of others, but to do so for different reasons at different times. Thus, in the Narmada case, the Court derisively characterized the Narmada Bachao Andolan, the petitioner, as an 'anti-dam organization' and declared that the "displacement of these people would undoubtedly disconnect them from their past, culture, custom and traditions, but then it becomes necessary to harvest a river for the larger good".
64 This is one reason why the Court is biased in favor of some rights over others. and therefore translated as a civil or political right. Given this history, it is not surprising that the Bar so often frames its arguments in terms of the rights in Part III.
A third reason for the bias of the Court in favor of some rights over others has to do with social movement politics itself. Social movements in India, as elsewhere, tend to be highly suspicious of courts and law because of their perception as elite defenders of the status quo. In the Indian context, this perception is not without reality. As such, social movements tend to approach courts relatively rarely unless they stand to gain immediately either through publicity, or to stave off disasters. Given that social movements tend to be a primary driving force behind the enforcement of most socioeconomic rights, this has the result of keeping these rights issues off the Court's agenda. , 1995) . This is distinct from the broader charge that violations of economic and social rights are systematically ignored when compared to violations of civil and political rights. As the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has put it, "the shocking reality . . . is that States and the international community as a whole continue to tolerate all too often breaches of economic, social and cultural rights which, if they occurred in relation to civil and political rights, would provoke expressions of horror and outrage and would lead to concerted calls for immediate remedial action. In effect, despite the rhetoric, violations of civil and political rights continue to be treated as though they were far more serious, and more patently intolerable, than massive and direct denials of economic, social and cultural rights. were serious divisions over the responsibilities of states. 75 Indeed, the covenants, being treaties, were drafted as the legal responsibilities of states. As such, the concern during the drafting of the covenants was not so much whether socio-economic rights were important for human dignity (a major goal of the effort) but whether the states could afford to guarantee them. In other words, the human rights debate became one about state capacity rather than human dignity. 76 In the context of the 1960s, this was then a debate about the appropriate developmental role of the state -a proxy war between the dirigist and market-oriented models of economy.
In this debate, so-called developing countries -at least those that were decolonized -were mostly supportive of a strong role of the state in the economy. The reason was that these newly independent countries were terribly interested in nation building and saw the state as the main instrument for achieving economic and social development, so that they could "catch up" with the west. India was no exception. I would suggest that this is in fact the emerging meaning of socio-economic rights as can be see from recent dissident strands of constitutional and international jurisprudence as well as the practice of social movements that are discussed in the next section.
c. A third critique is that socio-economic rights are not justiciable or as the ICESCR puts it, the rights are "progressively realizable" within "available resources".
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The argument is that this is both because it costs money to implement them, and also because judges lack the legitimacy, competence and the power to be seen in the idea that certain rights are core rights while others are not. Even in specialized areas of human rights such as those relating to labor, the idea of core standards is prevalent. 88 If we look at what these are, they invariable turn out to be civil and political rights (freedom to organize for instance) but not socioeconomic rights (such as occupational health). The idea of core rights is not only arbitrary, ideological and biased, it is also dangerous, as it shows a green signal for violation of other rights by states and other actors.
In addition to the problems that are inherent in the conceptualization of socioeconomic rights, it is also often suggested that there are also specific problems relating to 87 Amarta Sen, Development as Freedom (1999), chapter 1-4. 88 See ILO Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work, June 1998, available at www.ilo.org. These criticisms are three fold. 89 First, it is mentioned that judges lack the legitimacy to adjudicate socio-economic rights because they are not elected representatives of the people. The reason why this is important is that the determination of socio-economic rights is said to require decisions of a budgetary nature, which are supposed to be left to other branches of government. Ordering the enforcement of a right to housing will, in this view, unnecessarily intrude into the domain of the legislature and the executive by shifting resources from other areas. Second, it is alleged that judges lack the technical competence to adjudicate socio-economic rights as they require mastery of complex social and economic policies and often massive amount of data. It is advised that judges should leave this complex task to administrative agencies that have the competence to do it. A third critique is that a judicial approach to the enforcement of socio-economic rights is not the right way to their realization as it is too fragmentary, Second, the question of competence of judges over economic and social policies is also a ruse. Administrative agencies and often legislators are often equally incompetent over the details of economic and social policy and yet they take crucial decisions that shape public policy. Besides, adjudication of commercial and related matters such as antitrust or tax requires a great deal of technical skill that judges are allowed and even expected to have. If they can do so in commercial matters, why can't they do the same in adjudicating socio-economic rights?
Third, the problem of scale, that an adjudicatory approach to socio-economic rights is not by itself adequate, is a serious critique. An excessive reliance on the judiciary to realize socio-economic rights is certainly bad and will not address systemic problems such as chronic health crises, massive poverty, homelessness etc. However, this critique wrongly assumes that countries put all their policy eggs in the judicial basket. No country in the world does so and India certainly does not do so. In fact, most countries have massive social and economic programs geared to address chronic problems in society that constitute socio-economic rights violations. These are often supported and expanded by many civil society actors such as NGOs. The role of the court is by definition, a limited and supplementary one even in countries such as India where massive public-private programs are put in place to address poverty, homelessness, AIDS crisis and so forth, and the Court must often take on an administrative law model of judging to monitor the delivery of government programs.
While the traditional criticisms of socio-economic rights continue to matter, there are whole range of new issues that have arisen regarding the conceptualization and enforcement of these rights, as well as the actors on whom liability may be imposed for violations. The context for these new issues lies in greater social movement struggles over socio-economic rights. These new issues must be properly understood and appreciated by judges, if socio-economic rights are to be successfully and sustainably realized.
By now it is obvious that one of the major reasons for the weakness of socioeconomic rights is the extent to which these rights have been reduced to either building state capacity or to consumerism. Put differently, socio-economic rights have been the victims of the ideology of development and so-called 3 rd generation rights have especially become a proxy for the frustrations of Third World states due to their failure to achieve a NIEO. This is unfortunate, and the whole regime of human rights needs to be freed from the stifling ideological baggage of the 1960s that continues to bedevil it. That ideological baggage saw development in macroeconomic terms, a matter of large capital-intensive projects, import substituting industrialization, a large state presence in civil society including control of unions, a single party structure, weak judiciaries, a nation-building ideology, a commitment to the rationale of 'catching up' with the West, and the valorization of the national identity over all other identities. Contesting the ideology of development is central to this task and it has not truly begun except in the periphery in the form of social movement action in the Third World. 90 In the eyes of social movements, which consist of the most vulnerable and poor populations in the Third World, it is the attempt to impose 'development' on them that have made them worse off.
Development is, in this view, the disease rather than the cure. Without performing this cathartic task, socio-economic rights will simply continue to be seen as the best way to sneak a gigantic welfare state in, while so-called 3 rd generation rights will continue to be seen as a replay of a tired old debate over technology transfer, greater development assistance and better terms of trade. While a welfare state and the goals of the NIEO may continue to be important, they must be sought elsewhere and through different channels,
and not through the human rights discourse.
A second challenge is to reconceptualize the background norms of private lawincluding property, contracts and tort -that underlie the operation of the market which produces and perpetuates poverty, domination and exclusion. 91 This is perhaps the most difficult challenge in making socio-economic rights a reality to those to whom they A fourth new issue that must be noted is the rising concern about the increasing incompatibility between fundamental norms of international law relating to human rights and other aspects of international law that promote economic globalization. Judicializing socio-economic rights may also serve to recover human rights from its selfimposed limitations, by aiding the political and social demands of social movements but only so long as socio-economic rights are reconceptualized, as I have argued. peoples cannot be trumped arbitrarily by international law and how principles of environmental law and equity serve to shape outcomes.
Other international courts such as the ICTY and ICTR or the HRC have had little to say about socio-economic rights due to their subject matter or territorial jurisdiction, have also argued that recent international and comparative judicial experience has much to offer the Indian Supreme Court to transform its jurisprudence into a more peoplefriendly one. Socio-economic rights do not have to remain as second-class rights to which courts pay lip service and even that only so long as they fit into a developmentalist world view. However, in order to do so, these rights must themselves be reconceptualized to move away from market fundamentalism, state fetishism and the culture-ideology of consumerism. They must, instead, be refashioned as counterhegemonic mobilizing strategies in which the Court and social movements partner to achieve social justice. The Court must also begin to pay more attention to emerging dimensions of socio-economic rights including the responsibilities of transnational corporations and agencies as well as the relationship between different branches of international law in domestic law. There are creative opportunities for expanding the jurisprudence of the Court. There are a number of substantive and procedural areas where the frontiers of law can be pushed to make it more legitimate. The Court's legitimacy will depend to a large extent on its ability to offer support to social movement struggles which are primarily focused on the realization of economic and social rights at a time of economic liberalization and globalization.
